gary june caughron

Troy Gene Caughron, age 81 of Pigeon Forge, passed away Saturday, December 20, 2014. While neither state nor federal trial judges can require advance disclosure of statements, U.S. v. Algie, 667 F.2d 569 (6th Cir.1982) and State v. Taylor, supra, prosecutors *536 should nevertheless avoid needless delay by following the State's example here. Obviously, Rule 26.2(c) applies to such pretrial motion hearings. He also asked April to watch Jones as she closed her shop and see where she put her money, and to find out if Jones was married and had a telephone or pets. See also United States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir.1984); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir.1983); United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.1983); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1346 (7th Cir. During the summer of 1988, Caughron himself gave law enforcement officers various statements. He argues that Jones was unconscious during most of the acts that occurred that night. Nichols, 581 So. The court therefore specifically instructed the jury that it had acted, not to emphasize that part of the charge, but to "comport exactly" with the law. The first such testimony objected to by Defendant was that of April Ward, to the effect that she was upset with Jones because of a conversation that Jones had had with her mother; that she was mad at Jones because "no one approved of us on the porch"; and that she hurt Jones because she hated her for going to her mother and trying to separate her from the Defendant. 1985). To use a colloquialism that summarizes the situation most descriptively, Caughron's attorneys were effectively "stone-walled" by state officials involved in the investigation and prosecution of this case. In D. Paine, Tennessee Law of Evidence, 611.6 (2nd ed. The police department and the district attorney's office clearly understood April Ward's significance as a prosecution witness. Complaining that she had "tightened up on him," he then slapped the victim on the right buttock. Ward testified that she and Caughron also sat on the floor and drank Jones' blood from shot glasses. We find no reversible error. To ensure against such an interpretation of the opinion in Jencks, the United States Congress enacted 18 U.S.C.A. Hence, both the due process violation by police in directing April Ward's mother not to let her talk to defense counsel, and the extenuation of that due process violation by the prosecutor in wrongfully withholding Brady material, could have been overcome in this case, had the trial court given defense counsel an adequate opportunity to review that material at an appropriate point during the trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to examine the State's files. Dr. Madeline Pareau, a clinical psychologist, testified that Defendant's full IQ was 78, "just a little above mentally retarded classification." 2d at 1249 (citing Gallman, 195 So. Such a deprivation violates the right-to-counsel provision found in Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, as well as the Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution. App. App. Under State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947 (Tenn. 1978), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting their introduction. We are of the opinion that defense counsel, and his defense team, were given a reasonable opportunity to examine and prepare to use the statements in cross-examining April Ward. The testimony involving drug use, "satanic" sketches and listening to rock music, while corroborating statements made by the accomplice, should not have been admitted but there is no harmful error under the facts of this record since April Ward's testimony had already presented these features of the Defendant's character. 1984). To condone the trial court's action in the name of avoiding delay in the trial, or from some misplaced sympathy for the accomplice, is to make a mockery of the procedural guarantees expressed in our modern rules of procedure and in case law interpreting the reach of due process in criminal trials. This request was denied, and April Ward's direct examination followed immediately. The trial court felt that the Defendant had failed to exercise due diligence in examining the door. "Second, Rule 26.2(f) now makes it clear that this rule applies not only to trial situations, but also to pretrial testimony such as might be given at a suppression hearing. It points out the obvious that April Ward's testimony not only made her the prosecution's "linchpin witness," but also constituted virtually the entire case for the state. Apr 2016 - Sep 20182 years 6 months. State v. Hartman, 703 S.W.2d 106, 116 (Tenn. 1985); Lillard v. State, 528 S.W.2d 207, 212 (Tenn. Crim. Defendant argues that the failure of the trial court to ask April Ward whether she understood the difference between telling the truth and a lie and whether she comprehended the importance of telling the truth rendered the competency evaluation conducted before she testified inadequate. Put simply, the price of saving less than a half-hour of trial time turned out to be "penny wise but pound foolish.". Because there were questions about the juror's objectivity and the Defendant was at "enormous risk," the court removed the juror. Jones instructed him to stay away. The court did not abuse its discretion here. The Defendant further complains that the trial court erred in admitting testimony *539 by Lettie Cruze that around the time of the murder, her daughter, April Ward, was having trouble in school and crying a lot. Defendant's next objection was to the testimony of April's mother that the victim had told her that as a rule she did not get involved in other people's affairs but that she thought "April was a sweet little girl and she didn't trust Gary Caughron." Ward was a young and highly emotional witness and at times it was necessary to lead her "to develop" her testimony. Prior to trial, the court granted the Defendant's request for a competency hearing as to Ward, then seventeen, because she was a juvenile. [9] There is no way to know to what extent this aspect of April's testimony may have affected the jury's decision to impose the death penalty. See State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 368 (Tenn. 1982), cert. We agree with those circuits holding that a defendant must show that the failure to earlier disclose prejudiced him because it came so late that the information disclosed could not be effectively used at trial." DAUGHTREY, J., and REID, C.J., dissent. He was. It is this latter possibility that should lead this Court to hold that the trial court's denial of counsel's request for a recess or a reasonable time to review the statements under Rule 26.2(d) constitutes reversible error. ), cert. The question of competency is a matter for the trial court's discretion. He was a member of Maples Branch Baptist Church and was retired from the City of Pigeon Forge. It is axiomatic that a trial judge should exercise care not to express any thought that might lead the jury to infer that the judge is in favor of or against the defendant in a criminal trial. He was a member of Millican Grove Baptist Church where he attended and taught Sunday school for many years. Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299, 1308 (3d Cir.1987). In United States v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 655 F. Supp. There was a "patch" of "scraping type of injuries caused by some kind of slender linear object like whipping marks" on the left back side of her chest beneath her shoulder blades. They have also lived in Decatur, IL. App. Join Facebook to connect with Gary Caughron and others you may know. Nevertheless, if defense counsel had been given an opportunity to make effective use of the material, that is, time to review those contradictory statements and time to prepare for April Ward's cross-examination based on what was contained in those statements, the due process problem in this case might have been avoided. When she returned to the bedroom, she saw the Defendant striking Jones's back with the pool stick. Although the duty of the trial court to order a recess under subsection (d) is couched in permissive terms, the federal cases make it clear that failure to permit counsel reasonable time for review constitutes error. No abuse of discretion warranting reversal is shown in this case. His father, whom Pareau described as "overtly psychotic," was an alcoholic and had physically abused his mother until their divorce. Outside, she said, the Defendant used the knife he had given her to cut the telephone lines to make it appear that whoever had killed Jones had not wanted her to use the telephone. If the issue is not considered waived, there is no indication in the record and no reason to believe that the jurors who remained were prejudiced against the Defendant by the juror's remark, which was a comment upon counsel's repetitive questioning not upon the merits of the case. When it became apparent that Dedrick would not be at trial, defense counsel expressly stated he did not want a continuance because of the stipulation. Ogle had been a boyfriend of Teresa Goad, one of the victim's daughters. In State v. Groseclose, 615 S.W.2d 142 (Tenn. 1981), and State v. Strouth, 620 S.W.2d 467 (Tenn. 1981), in which the victims were unconscious for part of the time, death penalties rendered under this aggravating circumstance were upheld. 804(b)(5). (Doc. Thus, only a part of a witness' statement may be relevant to the hearing. State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 359 (Tenn. 1982). The court urged the defense counsel to move along by directing the examination to the evidence that was material and important for the jury to consider. It was only the first in a series of efforts to thwart defense access to information about the case. The second episode occurred when State's witness Tom Diddly recognized one of the jurors as the owner of the wrecker service that had towed Defendant's car when the witness worked on it. At sentencing the trial court instructed as an aggravating circumstance: "The defendant allowed the victim to be treated with exceptional cruelty during the commission of the offense." Gary June Caughron v. State of Tennessee - CourtListener.com Gary June Caughron v. State of Tennessee, 03C01-9707-CC-00301 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Howell, 698 S.W.2d 84, 86-87 (Tenn. Crim. ), cert. D. Paine, Tennessee Law of Evidence, 103.3 (2d ed. She said that after the two of them undressed, Caughron rubbed the victim's blood on both their bodies as they engaged in sex on the floor beside the bed where Jones lay. Also, the language of T.R.E. In that case the Court held that defense counsel has a right to inspect prior statements or reports by a government witness, following *535 direct examination of the witness, to the extent that those reports or statements are related to the witness's testimony on direct examination, for the purpose of using them to prepare or conduct cross-examination. 2d 30 (1977); State v. Brownell, 696 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tenn. Crim. There was no abuse of discretion here. In the package were over 100 pages of typewritten and handwritten materials, comprising the statements of 20 different persons. Id. Public records show that the phone number (478) 923-6928 is linked to Gary S Caughron, Jennae M Drane. 138.) His aunt testified that, on the Friday night after he bought a green and white Oldsmobile, he came to his grandmother's house around 11 or 12 o'clock and went to bed. Gary J. Aguirre is an American lawyer, former investigator with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and whistleblower . First, there is no reasonable basis in fact for the trial court's allegation that defense counsel had not been diligent, either in his representation of his client or in the discharge of his duties as an officer of the court. Caughron told another prisoner, Roy Haynes, that on the night of the murder, he and his girlfriend had driven to a house on Cove Road or Cove Mill Road (the victim lived on Cole Drive) in Pigeon Forge and that from that point "he couldn't remember nothing he was so messed up on cocaine." Palermo, supra, at 355-6, 79 S. Ct. at 1226-7. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. The evidence was relevant because of Ward's testimony about drinking the victim's blood from a shot glass and Cruze's testimony about the Defendant's pink toothbrush. 40-2044, enacted in 1968, permitted pretrial discovery of documents, photographs, and tangible objects. These were objections ordinarily made when and if the potentially objectionable testimony occurred. 2d 1304 (1959): Thus, federal law permits the courts to overlook Jencks violations only in the narrowest of circumstances:[7]. 2d 537 (1969). For there can be no dispute, given the facts of this case, that the error committed by the trial court was prejudicial. The phone numbers associated with Judy: (478) 923-6928 (Bellsouth Telecommunications, LLC), (478) 284-7727 (Sprint Spectrum LPBellsouth Telecommunications, LLC). Id. In my judgment, the violation of subsection (d) in this case is so clear that the only remaining question concerns the relief that should be granted in light of this error. In any event, the proof shows that in addition to inflicting the head injuries, the Defendant tied Ann Jones to the bed, attempted to rape her (probably anally), beat her with a pool stick, slapped her buttocks so hard that an imprint of his hand was left on her skin, gagged and strangled her, and drank her blood after smearing it on himself and his accomplice, with whom he had sex as the victim lay dying nearby. Obviously, whether any one of these provisions has been violated and what action must be taken to correct the error can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, in context both the evidence in the record and the procedure followed at trial. Get free summaries of new Tennessee Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! Top recordings of the year were Tommy Dorsey's "I'll Never Smile Again" (vocal Frank Sinatra) - 12 weeks at the top, Bing Crosby's "Only Forever" - 9 weeks at the top, and Artie Shaw's "Frenesi" - 12 weeks at the top. Our examination of the record shows at least five occasions when Defendant objected to the State's questioning of Ward as leading. He picked her up sometime after midnight. Oklahoma troopers said Henry L. Boren, 80, apparently fell. He reminded the trial judge that he had not received the package of statements until after court adjourned the previous night. Noting the conclusions of the Seventh, Tenth, Third and Eighth Circuits, that court held that "[t]he point in the trial when a disclosure is made is not in itself determinative . There was a gag tied across her mouth, and strips of the blue terry cloth had been wrapped tightly around her neck. In State v. Tanner, 175 W. Va. 264, 332 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1985), the Court held: "The question of whether the error was harmless or prejudicial hinges upon whether there was a substantial discrepancy between the contents of the prior statement or report and the witness's testimony during trial.". Based on this authority, "the serious nature of [the] case," and the witness's testimony that the prosecutor's letter influenced his decision not to talk to defense counsel, the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. [The statements are] not that different [from each other]." 729 F.2d at 260-61. One night, two or three weeks before the murder, Ann Jones made the Defendant Caughron, who had been drinking, leave her shop because he was acting in a disorderly manner. T.R.E. App. Her skull had been fractured and the cartilage in her nose displaced by the beating. Gen. and Reporter, Merrilyn Feirman, Asst. Accord, United States v. Winner, 666 F.2d 447, 448-449 (10th Cir.1981); United States v. Knowles, 594 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Aaron, 457 F.2d 865, 869 (2nd Cir.1972). For this reason, it would be necessary to hold that they constitute "plain error" in order to avoid a finding of waiver on the defendant's part and grant relief on either ground. She described her nephew as "slow" and said that he had a good attitude since he had been in jail. 2d 983 (1983). After allowing the Defendant to approach the bench prior to the testimony of Dr. Cleland Blake, April Ward, Jimmy Lynn Huskey, and Lettie Marie Cruze, when the State called witness Robert Yoakum, and defense counsel again approached the bench, the trial court refused to continue to "pre-review" the testimony, told defense counsel to object to questions as they were asked, and promised that it would then rule on the objections. The court denied counsel's request for another night in which to review the statements. To insist on honoring the due process rights of the accused is an obligation imposed on courts and the judicial system by the state and federal constitutions. 16(a)(1)(A). Wharton on Criminal Procedure. However, the Tennessee rule applies to all pretrial motions under Rule 12(b). The sole issue is whether counsel was afforded a reasonable opportunity to examine the statements. He also contends that this evidence was irrelevant. We are in agreement with the conclusion of the trial judge that Ward's testimony, as it related to the victim's statements, was not hearsay inasmuch as it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. In pertinent part, the Tennessee Rule reads as follows:[4]. The Defendant next asserts that the trial court prejudiced Defendant's case by indicating to the jury throughout the trial that the court believed that the Defendant was guilty. The next day, the trial judge refused to recess trial following April Ward's testimony on direct examination, despite counsel's representation that he had not had adequate time to review her pretrial statements and was unprepared to cross-examine her. 793 F.2d at 413. 02/14/94 STATE TENNESSEE v. VICTOR JAMES CAZES . The trial of this case lasted four days. For example, in Kines v. Butterworth, 669 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.1981), cert. 855 S.W.2d 526 (1993) | Cited 4 times. At his last interview, when confronted with falsehoods in his prior statements, Caughron became upset and walked out of the room. In United States v. Darwin, 757 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir.1985), the Eleventh Circuit faced a situation in which the government had disclosed impeachment evidence after a witness had testified. [6] Whatever value there is in maintaining efficiency in the trial of criminal cases (and it is considerable under normal circumstances), efficiency must be assigned a low priority where procedural rights of an accused are at stake. The record reveals, however, that the court was in the habit of telling the jurors that they did not have to look at potentially distasteful physical evidence, such as the cloth that had bound the victim, when it was passed to them. Near the end of the direct examination, during a break in testimony taken to deal with an unrelated question, Ogle noted that it was 4:05 p.m.; he again reminded the trial judge that he had not had an opportunity to read all of April's prior statements; and he said, "I would ask the Court to allow me to start my cross-examination in the morning, because I am not prepared and there's no way in the world I can cross-examine this witness today." The testimony concerning the pool stick, the table cloth material, and slapping women on the buttocks was relevant to connect Defendant to this crime and corroborate the accomplice's testimony. In this case the proof vividly shows that this murder involved both torture and depravity of mind. The State asserts, correctly under T.R.A.P. The majority opinion contains a brief history of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2 and its genesis in federal law, and a passing reference to State v. Taylor, 771 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. 1989), the only reported decision of this Court directly interpreting Rule 26.2. Detective Bean did testify that on August 25, 1988, when he asked Defendant why he attempted to kill himself after Davenport had initially talked with him about Jones's murder, Defendant replied that he was depressed and had a lot on his mind. denied, 444 U.S. 833, 100 S. Ct. 65, 62 L. Ed. Gary R Caughron 1933 - 1993. Caughron said that he stayed at his grandmother's house on the night of the killing and had been riding around with a friend and his wife at the time of the murder. App. Gary is currently based in Ruidoso, New Mexico. The hearsay statements sought to be admitted, however, bore none of the "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness" present in Chambers, see 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S. Ct. at 1048-1049 (confession made spontaneously to a close acquaintance soon after murder, corroborating evidence present, statement was self-incriminatory and unquestionably against interest). Officer Tippens was one of the first officers on the scene the day the murder was discovered. Ogle, noting that it was 4:12 p.m., again asked for an overnight recess. 1990), the writers suggest that leading questions may be used to shorten the time needed for a witness to testify or to facilitate the direct examination of a young or otherwise impaired witness. The court next defined "cruel," "torture" and "depravity" in accord with State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517, 529-530 (Tenn. 1985). Over the Defendant's objection the trial court allowed the State to recall the victim's daughter, Christy Jones Scott, to testify that her mother owned a collection of shot glasses and a pink Oral B toothbrush. See Graves v. State, 489 S.W.2d 74, 81 (Tenn. Crim. On the allegations regarding the need to examine the bedroom door, the Defendant sought to show that the footprint on the door was larger than the Defendant's would have been. Jones's legs and arms had been bound and tied to the bed with strips of blue terry cloth and pieces of sheer, off-white material like that used for table cloths and curtains. Noting that the statements were admitted falsehoods, the trial court refused to allow their introduction. Dr. Blake concluded that Jones had died as a result of asphyxiation while unconscious. There was, in short, no violation of Rule 26.2 and thus no error, in the majority's view. ), cert. The Defendant suggested that April accompany Jones to her house after *531 work and give him directions on how to get there. The first day was consumed by arguments and rulings on unfinished pretrial business, including defense counsel's request that the trial court order early production of witness statements, and by selection of the jury. In 1840 there were 2 Caughron families living in Tennessee. In the majority's judgment, two hours would have been sufficient time to comply with the requirements of Rule 26.2. The family will celebrate Mr. Caughron's life 11:30 a.m. Wednesday, June 2, 2010, at Woodberry Forest School's Johnson Stadium with Joe Coleman officiating. denied 429 U.S. 821, 97 S. Ct. 69, 50 L. Ed. The City Council last year officially declared June to be Pride Month in Solvang, and the town, just a few years ago, had a gay mayor. The majority "emphasize[s] that this case does not involve the denial of Rule 26.2 statements." The boot print on the victim's bedroom door established that someone other than the defendant had kicked in the door. April testified that Caughron entered the house by himself and then summoned her inside. He also told McGaha he had lost a ring. Gary Allen Caughron, 51, of Cameron died Tuesday, June 2, 2015, in Fort Smith, Ark. [Emphasis added.] Blausen Medical is a leading provider of illustration, animation and simulation for Health Care and related industries, providing . 94-626-II Joseph M. Tipton Affirmed Rule 11 Denied - Application of Gary June Caughron. April said that the Defendant tightened the terry cloth strip around Jones's neck, causing the victim to gasp. Berating defense counsel for his repeated efforts to secure a recess, the trial judge said: Following the brief recess, the trial judge added: Before beginning an analysis of the legal principles applicable to these facts, two observations seem pertinent, both based on a careful reading of the transcript in this case. Phillips seemed to think that by testifying he would be risking a charge of perjury. April then became upset with Ann Jones because of a conversation Jones had had with her mother that led to her mother's disapproval of the relationship. 2d 119 (1969), the prosecuting attorney advised the witnesses to two robberies not to talk to anyone in his absence. Byrnes v. United States, 327 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir.1964). Owner: caughron gary & sharon Tax Year: 2016 Tax Amount: $82.32 Total Market Value: $8,400 Sale Price: $55,000 +Edit Past Address 505 Orchard Rd, Hector, AR 72843 View Address +Edit Past Address 7346 Sr 105 N, Russellville, AR 72802 View Address +Edit Past Address Hc 33 Box 17, Tilly, AR 72679 View Address +Edit Personal Details View All 264, 195 So. GARY JUNE CAUGHRON. The photographs and the videotape taken at the murder scene are highly probative, in that they show the condition of the body and clarify oral testimony. His stepfather, for example, had beaten him and humiliated him for bedwetting. Of course, the prosecution might have overcome any prejudice caused by police interference with the defendant's efforts to prepare his defense, had the state produced April Ward's various conflicting statements in response to the defendant's motion for pretrial disclosure. This is one of the most brutal and sadistic killings this Court has reviewed. You're all set! Phillips had given a statement to law enforcement officials on July 15, 1987, in which he stated that two persons, a man and a woman who were not the defendant and April Ward, had approached him about robbing and killing a woman in Pigeon Forge, possibly the victim Dorothy Ann Jones, although Phillips did not give the woman's name. 2d 457 (1985) (citing United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39 (3d Cir.1983)), that "no violation occurs as long as Brady material is disclosed to a defendant in time for its effective use at trial." Jencks caused some controversy in the months after it was announced, centering on fears that it would force government prosecutors to turn over investigatory files, in their entirety, upon defense demand. For the reasons set out above, I dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the defendant's conviction in this case. Their efforts are unappreciated by the public generally and undercompensated by the justice system they serve. The Defendant avers that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to ask leading questions of April Ward on direct examination. When court resumed the next morning at 9:00 a.m., the defendant's lead attorney, Carl R. Ogle, told the trial judge even before the first witness was called that he appreciated having received copies of the witnesses' statements the night before, but that he had not had a chance to review all the material that had been turned over to him. Id. When, later that day, the state called April Ward as its fourth witness, Ogle told the trial judge that he had had time to review only one of April's statements and asked that trial be adjourned until the next morning to permit him to examine the rest of her statements before she testified. State v. Elliott, 703 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tenn. Crim. Taylor, of course, stands for the obvious proposition that on motion, "a[] statement of the witness that relates to the subject matter concerning which the witness has testified" must be "produce[d] for the examination and use of the moving party," but only "[a]fter [that] witness has testified on direct examination." The courts already demand much of attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants, especially those who (like Caughron) face imposition of the ultimate penalty. Id. He then struck her brutally and repeatedly about her head until, according to April Ward, she no longer moved. Testimony about April's emotional reaction to the murder tends to bolster her credibility, as does testimony about her continued contact with the Defendant. Hence, courts have suggested that both the Sixth Amendment's right to compulsory process, Id., and the right to confrontation are implicated in the violation of the procedural guarantees of Rule 26.2. It was April's testimony that it was only after the victim stopped moving that the other abuse occurred. Tippens was unable to come to trial because of a back condition. Thus, the majority concludes, the prosecution's "advance production satisfied the State's duty under Rule 26.2 and avoided the needless delay of the trial," and the trial court's decision "to proceed, apparently to allow April Ward to finish her testimony that day" was not an abuse of discretion. Subsection (d) states that the court "may recess proceedings in the trial for the examination of such statement and for preparation for its use in the trial." Given the centrality of April Ward's testimony, the inherent unreliability which attaches to that testimony by virtue of the half-dozen contradictory statements she made over a five-month period prior to trial, and the trial court's failure to grant counsel a reasonable period of time in which to capitalize upon those various pretrial statements, it appears that the Rule 26.2(d) error in this case was prejudicial.
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